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Abstract — The article provides a solution algorithm for 
the linear programming problem (LPP) with the latter being 
presented as an antagonistic matrix game so the game's further 
solution is based on the iterative method. The algorithm is 
presented as a computer program. Having applied necessary 
accuracy, the author has researched the solution assessment 
convergence rate in relation to the actual value. Program 
implementation demonstrates high rate of the LPP solution 
receipt, with the acceptable accuracy being fractions or unities. It 
allows using the algorithm in the integrated systems for the 
purpose of their optimal control.  
Keywords — linear programming, matrix games, 
iterative algorithm, integrated control systems. 
INTRODUCTION 
The task of limited resource distribution can be met 
rather often in different applied disciplines. Usually, a choice 
of optimal control in the modern control systems occurs with 
a certain regularity or as a reaction at some events. A majority 
of the situations involving the choice of optimal control can 
be presented as mathematical programming problems, with 
the linear programming problems (LPP) amounting to their 
considerable proportion.  
LPP takes a special place among the methods of 
optimal control and/or optimal distribution of limited 
resources as it can become a conclusion of many applied 
problems whose original form does not resemble LPP at all; 
they are, for example, controlled Markov chains [1], transport 
problem [2, 3], problem of allocation [3], matrix games [4, 5] 
etc. The applied industries, which are used to solve the 
problems, are also very diverse. They include, for instance, 
control of robotic groups [6], distribution of communication 
channels in robotic systems (RS), distribution of efforts and 
means when managing emergency situations, building an 
optimal industrial program [7] etc. 
John von Neumann, a matrix game founder, 
identified [4] a close connection between matrix games and 
linear programming [8]. However, in practice, we are mostly 
aware of those methods of solving antagonistic matrix games 
that are reduced to LPP, thus allowing finding the solution of 
the random dimensionality matrix games.   
Simplex method is a standard way of solving LPP (in 
various modifications). Still, multiple research [8] 
demonstrates that it cannot always provide a guarantee of 
finding an optimal solution. Other research methods also 
possess this defect. In many ways, the convergence indicators 
of research methods depend on the data of a specific applied 
problem. Heuristic modifications of simplex method, for 
example those applied in MS Excel, are usually directed at 
the convergence improvement. Moreover, other 
disadvantages of this method include awkwardness and non-
obviousness of computational procedures. Today, these 
disadvantages are usually compensated with the user 
qualification, who, when working with the majority of 
modern optimization software, is presented with a range of 
parameters that can be modified for the purpose of obtaining 
an acceptable solution. However, all attempts that have been 
made to implement the above-mentioned models in the real-
time control systems, for instance in on-board computers of 
modern integrated systems, have led to a significant decrease 
of their operating reliability. Therefore, we have a question: 
can we find a replacement to our "workhorse", i.e. the simplex 
method?  
The algorithm, which has been suggested in this 
article, is a considerably more simple and obvious method 
that allows to obtain a solution with a prescribed accuracy. 
This provides a possibility, in each specific application, to 
find a compromise between the solution's accuracy and 
number of iterations, i.e. the computational speed. The 
method offered herein is based on the one-one correlation of 
LPP and antagonistic matrix games (AMG) and bears the 
name of the Game Iteration Method. Let us consider its 
main elements. 
LPP-BASED TRADITIONAL AMG SOLUTION 
SCHEME 
AMG (zero sum games) have been traditionally [5] 
solved by their presentation as LPP. The essence of this 
transformation is the following. Usually, the game is set with 
a payoff matrix ?̃? = [?̃?𝑖𝑗]𝑚𝑛. ?̃?𝑖𝑗 elements demonstrate the 
first player's payoff (P1) in each game. Since the game has a 
zero sum, ?̃?𝑖𝑗  is simultaneously also the loss value of the 
second player (P2). To solve the game means [5] to find a pair 
of optimal mixed strategies of players ?̅? =
[𝑝1 𝑝2 … 𝑝𝑚]𝑇, ?̅? = [𝑞1 𝑞2 … 𝑞𝑛]𝑇, as well as the 
game's price 𝑉. Here, ?̅? and ?̅? are vector-columns of 
dimensionality, correspondingly of 𝑚 and 𝑛, while 𝑇 is a 
conjugation symbol. From now on we shall use a tilde to mark 
the elements of AMG and LPP that belong to the game form 
(solution of AMG with the aid of LPP). Using the vector-
matrix form, the game price can be presented as 𝑉 = ?̅?𝑇?̃??̅?. 
The normalization condition shall be performed for the vector 
components ?̅? and ?̅? that include the likelihood of players 
may applying some pure strategy: 
∑ 𝑝𝑖
𝑚
𝑖=1 = 1;                               (1) 
  
  ∑ 𝑞𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1 = 1.                               (2)   
If P1 applies his optimal mixed strategy and P2 any 
pure one, P1 shall receive the payoff not less than the 𝑉 game 
price should the game be repeated multiple number of times: 
∑ ?̃?𝑖𝑗𝑝𝑖
𝑚
𝑖=1 ≥ 𝑉;   𝑗 = 1, 𝑛̅̅ ̅̅̅.               (3) 
Having introduced the symbol: ?̃?𝑖 ≜
𝑝𝑖
𝑉
 and having 
inserted it in (1) we shall receive ∑ ?̃?𝑖
𝑚
𝑖=1 =
1
𝑉
. The P1's 
objective is to maximize his average payoff, i.e. 𝑉, the game 
price. It means that he should minimize the 
1
𝑉
 value. The 
values without a tilde shall mean variables of a standard LPP 
and corresponding indices of the delimitation system that are 
not directly related to the AMG. Therefore, with the 
consideration of introduced symbols and after having 
replaced variables in (3), we can write down the AMG-
obtained LPP setting as follows: 
∑ ?̃?𝑖𝑗?̃?𝑖
𝑚
𝑖=1 ≥ 1;   𝑗 = 1, 𝑛̅̅ ̅̅̅,                    (4)  
𝐿(?̅̃?) = ∑ ?̃?𝑖
𝑚
𝑖=1 → min
𝑥𝑖
 ,                     (5) 
where 𝐿(?̅̃?) is a LPP's objective function based on AMG. 
The solution of the LPP shall lead to the following 
solution of AMG for P1: 
𝑝𝑖 =
𝑥𝑖
𝐿𝑜𝑝𝑡
;  𝑖 = 1, 𝑚̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ;   𝑉 =
1
𝐿𝑜𝑝𝑡
,              (6) 
where 𝐿𝑜𝑝𝑡 is an optimal value of the objective function and 
?̃?𝑖 are the elements of the P1's optimal mixed strategy 
vector. 
We can also perform similar constructions for the 
second player (P2), with the result being the following: 
∑ ?̃?𝑖𝑗?̃?𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1 ≤ 1;   𝑖 = 1, 𝑚̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ,              (7)  
𝐿(?̅̃?) = ∑ ?̃?𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1 → max
?̃?𝑗
                 (8) 
The problem possesses dual characteristics in 
relation to the source LPP (4)-(5). After solving it, we shall 
obtain an optimal game solution for P2: 
𝑞𝑗 =
?̃?𝑗
𝐿𝑜𝑝𝑡
;   𝑗 = 1, 𝑛̅̅ ̅̅̅;   𝑉 =
1
𝐿𝑜𝑝𝑡
,              (9) 
That is a traditional technology [5, 9, 10] of solving 
AMG by its conversion into LPP, its solution and ultimate 
transformation of the obtained LPP solution into the AMG 
solution. At that, it is assumed that there exists an acceptable 
method of solving LPP, which is usually a simplex method 
[3]. Next we shall demonstrate a reverse algorithm, i.e. 
determination of the LPP solution by its transformation into 
AMG, searching for the solution and performing a reverse 
transformation of an obtained AMG solution into the LPP 
solution.  
AMG-BASED LPP SOLUTION 
In order to apply a reverse algorithm, we shall 
possess a matrix game solution method that is not based on 
LPP. There are not so many methods like that: method of 
Brown-Robinson [9, 10], monotonic iterative algorithm [11], 
graphical solving method [3] and some others. The most 
universal is a Brown-Robinson method, which allows looking 
for the solution of a random dimensionality AMG. Its 
structure is rather simple, but it can require a large number of 
monotypic calculations should the dimensionality of an AMG 
payoff matrix be very big. As the computing powers of 
computers (including on-board ones) are constantly growing, 
this method is becoming rather attractive for the AMG 
solution.  
Here we shall demonstrate the calculations that 
allow providing a LPP solution based on the solution of an 
equivalent AMG. At that, it is assumed that the AMG solution 
has been obtained without using the LPP solution algorithms. 
This scheme allows for the immediate receipt of both direct 
and dual LPP.   
Let us presume that LPP that has to be solved is 
presented as a maximum problem (thus the dual problem that 
corresponds to it shall be presented as a minimum problem). 
There are several forms of presenting LPP [8], which can be 
transformed into each other using a one-one principle. Next 
we shall apply a form of the maximum problem with the 
delimitations being (≤): 
𝐿(?̅?) = 𝑐̅𝑇?̅? = ∑ 𝑐𝑗𝑦𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1 → max
𝑦𝑗
 ,              (10)   
∑ 𝑎𝑖𝑗𝑦𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1 ≤ 𝑎𝑖0;   𝑖 = 1, 𝑚̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ;   𝑦𝑗 ≥ 0,          (11)  
 
where ?̅? = [𝑦1 𝑦2 … 𝑦𝑛]𝑇 is a vector of variables; 
𝑐̅ = [𝑐1 𝑐2 … 𝑐𝑛]𝑇- is an index vector of a linear 
objective function; 
𝐴 = [𝑎𝑖𝑗]𝑚𝑛- is an index matrix of the linear delimitation 
system; 
?̅?0 = [𝑎10 𝑎20 … 𝑎𝑚0]
𝑇- is a constant term vector of the 
delimitation system. 
Let us presume that 𝑐𝑗 > 0, 𝑎𝑖𝑗 > 0, 𝑎𝑖0 > 0. It is easy 
to see that the problem (10)-(11) can be reduced to the 
problem (7)-(8) should we introduce the following symbols: 
?̃?𝑖𝑗 =
𝑎𝑖𝑗
𝑎𝑖0𝑐𝑗
 ;                              (12) 
?̃?𝑗 = 𝑐𝑗𝑦𝑗so that 𝑦𝑗 =
?̃?𝑗
𝑐𝑗
.              (13) 
There is a one-one correlation between the (7)-(8) 
problem and the payoff matrix ?̃? = [?̃?𝑖𝑗]𝑚𝑛, whose elements 
are fully defined by the correlation (12). Therefore, it is 
possible to conclude that AMG was built on the basis of the 
LPP source data. 
In order to solve AMG, whose payoff matrix consists 
of elements mentioned in (12), we shall use a method of 
Brown-Robinson [9, 10], with the result being two vectors of 
optimal mixed strategies and the game price: ?̅? =
[𝑝1 𝑝2 … 𝑝𝑚]𝑇, ?̅? = [𝑞1 𝑞2 … 𝑞𝑛]𝑇, 𝑉.  
Having obtained an AMG solution and using (6), (9) 
and (13) it is possible to obtain a solution of the direct LPP, 
dual LPP as well as the optimal value of the objective function 
pertaining to the source LPP (they are similar both for the 
direct and dual problems): 
  
𝐿𝑜𝑝𝑡 =
1
𝑉
;  𝑦𝑗
𝑜𝑝𝑡 =
𝑞𝑗
𝑐𝑗𝑉
;  𝑥𝑖
𝑜𝑝𝑡 =
𝑝𝑖
𝑎𝑖0𝑉
,            (14) 
where 𝑖 = 1, 𝑚̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ;   𝑗 = 1, 𝑛̅̅ ̅̅̅.   
Thus, sequence of steps leading to the LPP solution 
(10) - (11) is the following:  
1. Construction of the AMG payoff matrix on the 
basis of the source LPP's parameters via the calculation of 
the AMG elements with the formula (12). 
2. Solving AMG using a Brown-Robinson method. 
3. Recalculation of an obtained AMG solution into 
the LPP solution using the formulas (14).  
Let us note some peculiarities of transforming LPP 
into AMG and back:  
a). if LPP is a maximum with n variables (columns) 
and m delimitations (lines), the index matrix of the left-side 
delimitations should be transformed into a payoff matrix that 
would also possess m lines and n columns. After solving the 
game, optimal values of n LPP variables can be obtained from 
the n-dimensional vector related to the optimal mixed strategy 
of the second player; 
b). if LPP is a minimum with n variables (columns) 
and m delimitations (lines), the index matrix of the left-side 
delimitations should be transformed into a payoff matrix and 
conjugated so that it would also possess n lines and m 
columns. After solving the game, optimal values of n LPP 
variables can be obtained from the n-dimensional vector 
related to the optimal mixed strategy of the first player. 
METHOD OF BROWN-ROBINSON 
Whereas in the method of game iterations applied for 
the AMG solution we have used Brown-Robinson method, let 
us provide here its summary. It was suggested by George W. 
Brown [9], while its convergence to the optimal (minimax) 
solution was proved by Julia Robinson [10]. It is also known 
as a method of fictitious play or iterative method. It is an 
iterative procedure that imitates a game looping, while it is 
also assumed that players perform an alternate choice of their 
next pure strategy taking into account all information on 
actions of an opponent that they have made in the previous 
games. Estimations of optimal mixed strategies are computed 
in the form of current frequencies related to the players' usage 
of their pure strategies during the whole observation interval, 
while the estimation of the game price is computed as an 
average of a current payoff of the P1 player and a loss of the 
P2 player.  The iterations stop when the set estimation 
accuracy has been achieved. Let us provide a formal 
presentation of this procedure. 
Let us assume that two players know all elements of 
the payoff matrix ?̃? = [?̃?𝑖𝑗]𝑚𝑛. They play several games, 
provided that in each game both players are able to see pure 
strategies that have been chosen by the opponent. In each 
game players choose their best strategies (P1 to maximize his 
payoff, P2 to minimize his loss). Performing his next (t+1) 
choice, each player takes into account pure strategy statistics 
chosen by his opponent during previous t steps: if P2 has 
chosen his j strategy 𝑄𝑗  times out of total number 𝑡 of games, 
P1 shall choose his i pure strategy so that he would maximize 
an average value of the payoff: 
𝑖(𝑡 + 1) = 𝑎𝑟𝑔 max
𝑖=1,𝑚̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑣𝑖(𝑡) = 𝑎𝑟𝑔 max
𝑖=1,𝑚̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
∑ 𝑎𝑖𝑗 ?̂?𝑗(𝑡)
𝑛
𝑗=1
,   (15) 
where ?̂?𝑗(𝑡) ≜
𝑄𝑗(𝑡)
𝑡
 is a current (after 𝑡 steps) estimation of an 
optimal mixed strategy of P2; 𝑣𝑖(𝑡) is an estimation of a 
current average payoff of P1 should he apply his 𝑖 pure 
strategy. 
Similarly, if P1 has applied his i strategy 𝑃𝑗 times, P2 
shall choose his j strategy so that he would minimize an 
average loss value: 
𝑗(𝑡 + 1) = 𝑎𝑟𝑔 min
𝑗=1,𝑛̅̅̅̅̅
𝑣𝑗(𝑡) = 𝑎𝑟𝑔 min
𝑗=1,𝑛̅̅̅̅̅
∑ 𝑎𝑖𝑗?̂?𝑖(𝑡)
𝑚
𝑖=1
,    (16) 
where ?̂?𝑖(𝑡) ≜
𝑃𝑖(𝑡)
𝑡
 is a current (after 𝑡 steps) estimation of an 
optimal mixed strategy of P1; 𝑣𝑗(𝑡) is an estimation of a 
current average payoff of P2 should he apply his 𝑗 pure 
strategy. 
Random values ?̂?𝑖(𝑡) and ?̂?𝑗(𝑡) demonstrate 
sequences of players' mixed strategy vector element 
estimations that would converge in the limit (as it was proved 
by J. Robinson [10]) in relation to the optimal mixed 
strategies. And the estimation of an average payoff of P1 and 
average loss of P2 that have been computed with the 
consideration of current estimations of optimal mixed 
strategies, results in the game price:  
𝑉 = lim
𝑡→∞
max
𝑖=1,𝑚̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑣𝑖(𝑡) = lim
𝑡→∞
min
𝑗=1,𝑛̅̅̅̅̅
𝑣𝑗(𝑡).           (17) 
Iterative process can be stopped when it has 
achieved necessary accuracy, with the latter being controlled 
as an absolute moving average value related to the game 
price estimation difference both for P1 and P2: 
∆𝑣(𝑡) = |max
𝑖=1,𝑚̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑣𝑖(𝑡) − min
𝑗=1,𝑛̅̅̅̅̅
𝑣𝑗(𝑡)|.              (18) 
When stopping an iterative process we can also use 
moving variability or moving root-mean-square deviation of 
∆𝑣(𝑡) value. Moreover, it is possible to build a stopping rule 
by introducing a specific criterion for the estimation vectors 
related to the players' optimal strategies. We shall 
demonstrate it further with an example.          
Multiple imitation experiments showed that the 
convergence process related to the acceptable number of 
iterations depends strongly on the game's payoff matrix 
element values, in particular, on the difference between the 
upper and lower price of the game. Here we demonstrate an 
estimation convergence for the 3 × 3 game. 
Example. The payoff matrix is as follows: 
𝐴 = [
6 1 4
2 4 2
4 3 5
].            
The game does not have a saddle point; therefore, 
mixed strategies should be applied when searching for the 
solution. If we use a traditional method of game convergence 
  
to LPP, the exact solution in this case shall be the following: 
?̅? = [0 0.33 0.67]𝑇, ?̅? = [0.33 0.67 0]𝑇, 𝑉 = 3.33.  
Graphical demonstration of the convergence for the 
solution's estimation elements obtained due to the method of 
Brown-Robinson for 100 steps is shown on Picture 1.
 
 
Pic. 1. Estimation convergence of the matrix game solution 
 
These are the final estimation values of the solution 
per 100 iterations: ?̂? = [0.01 0.35 0.64]𝑇, ?̂? =
[0.31 0.67 0.02]𝑇, ?̂? = 3.34. Thus, the deviation of the 
game price from the exact value is 0.3%.  
When dealing with model examples (when we know 
the exact solution), it is possible to consider a normalized 
distance of a vector showing the estimate vector difference 
and an actual vector of the optimal mixed strategy of the 
player as the precision measure of the current estimates 
related to the elements of the solution. Thus, the vector 
distance ρ̂𝑘 = ?̅? − ?̂?𝑘, being the distance from the normalized 
(located within the interval [0; 1]) estimate vector to the 
normalized vector of an actual optimal mixed strategy is 
shown on Picture 2. 
 
Pic. 2. Convergence of indices pertaining to the solution exactness 
 
The picture also contains another measure, i.e. one 
computed at each iteration. It is a step-by-step change of the 
maximum distance (norm) related to the vector showing the 
estimate vector difference in relation to the optimal strategies 
of P1 and P2 at adjacent iteration steps: δ̂𝑘 = max(‖?̂?𝑘 −
?̂?𝑘−1‖; ‖?̂?𝑘 − ?̂?𝑘−1‖). Estimates for the example state that 
after 100 iterations we have ρ̂100 = 0.023. It comprises 2.3% 
off the maximum possible deviation of the estimate vector 
from the actual one. Still, this measure is available only within 
the simulation research conditions. Another measure of 
convergence (δ̂𝑘) does not require to know the value of an 
actual optimal mixed strategy vector, being, therefore, 
available within conditions of the real application of the 
algorithm. Its value for the given example is δ̂100 = 0.007, 
i.e. 0.7% off the maximum possible value. In the given 
example, the correlation coefficient between these two 
measures constituted 0.87, thus showing a high statistic 
connection between these two measures of estimate 
convergence. Therefore, when using the Brown-Robinson 
algorithm in practice for the purposes of stopping the iterative 
algorithm, the application of δ̂  index is a highly likely one.   
LPP SOLUTION ALGORITHM USING A GAME 
ITERATION METHOD 
A highly detailed solution of the LPP by its 
transformation into the AMG, solving AMG using the 
Brown-Robinson method, as well as transformation of the 
obtained solution into the solution of the source LPP are 
shown below. Picture 3 contains a detailed scheme of solving 
LPP using the game iteration method for the modelling and 
applied problem solution modes. Picture 4 contains a detailed 
algorithm showing LPP's solution scheme based on the game 
iteration method.   
 
  
 
Picture 3 - Logic of the LPP algorithm solution scheme based on the game iteration method 
 
 
Algorithm 1. LPP Solution algorithm using a game iteration method 
 
Given: LPP at max: 𝐿(?̅?) = ∑ 𝑐𝑗𝑦𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1 → max
𝑦𝑗
 ; Ω?̅? = {∑ 𝑎𝑖𝑗𝑦𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1 ≤ 𝑎𝑖0;   𝑖 = 1, 𝑚̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ;   𝑦𝑗 ≥ 0}.  
All coefficients are set and positive: 𝑐𝑗 > 0, 𝑎𝑖𝑗 > 0, 𝑎𝑖0 > 0.  
Iterative process stopping parameters are set: maximum permissible number of iterations is 𝐾; ∆ is a threshold value of δ̂𝑘 
measure. 
To find: Optimal coordinate values of the vector of variables ?̅?: ?̅?𝑜𝑝𝑡 = 𝑎𝑟𝑔 max
Ω?̅?
𝐿(?̅?). 
 Transforming LPP into AMG 
1: for 𝑖 ≔ 1 to 𝑚 do {Computing payoff matrix elements} 
2:     for 𝑗 ≔ 1 to 𝑛 do 
3:          ?̃?𝑖𝑗 ≔
𝑎𝑖𝑗
𝑎𝑖0𝑐𝑗
  
4:     end for  
5: end for 
6: ?̃? ← [?̃?𝑖𝑗]𝑚𝑛 {Formation of a payoff matrix} 
 Solving AMG using a Brown-Robinson method 
7:  𝑖(𝑘): = 1 {At the 1st iteration (k=1) related to P1, any pure strategy should be chosen, let it be the 1st} 
8:  for 𝑗 ≔ 1 to 𝑛 do {A formation cycle of current average payoffs of P1} 
LPP reduction to its standard form 
(10) - (11) 
Checking non-negativity of 
LPP coefficients: 𝑐𝑗 ,  𝑎𝑖𝑗 ,  𝑎𝑖0  
Transforming LPP into its equivalent 
AMG using the formulas (12) 
Performing next iteration based on 
Brown-Robinson method according to 
(15) - (16) 
Checking number of iterations 
𝑘 ≤ 𝐾  
Checking exactness of 
solutions 𝛿 ≤ Δ  
End 
Transformation of the AMG solution 
into the LPP solution using the 
formulas (14) 
Applied problem, presented as LPP 
Estimates of the LPP's optimal 
solution presented as: ?̂?,  ?̂? 
Setting parameters of the iterative 
estimation 𝐾,  Δ 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Modelling: generating LPP 
coefficients 𝑐𝑗 ,  𝑎𝑖𝑗 ,  𝑎𝑖0 
  
9:      𝑏𝑗 ≔ ?̃?𝑖𝑗   
10: 𝐵𝑗(𝑘) ≔ 𝑏𝑗 {𝐵𝑗(𝑘) is a current average accumulated payoff of P1 at k-numbered iteration}  
11: end for  
12: 𝑉𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝑘) ≔ min
𝑗
𝐵𝑗(𝑘) {Current lower estimate of the game price} 
13: 𝑗(𝑘) ≔ 𝑎𝑟𝑔 min
𝑗
𝐵𝑗(𝑘) {Number of P2's pure strategy is chosen according to the P1's payoff} 
14: for 𝑖 ≔ 1 to 𝑚 do {A formation cycle of current average payoffs of P2} 
15:     𝑎𝑖 ≔ ?̃?𝑖𝑗  
16:     𝐴𝑖(𝑘) ≔ 𝑎𝑖  {𝐴𝑖(𝑘) is a current average accumulated payoff of P2 at k-numbered iteration}  
17: end for  
18: 𝑉𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑘) ≔ max
𝑖
𝐴𝑖(𝑘) {Current upper estimate of the game price} 
19: 𝑉(𝑘) ≔ (𝑉𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝑘) + 𝑉𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑘))/2{Current average estimate of the game price} 
20: for 𝑖 ≔ 1 to 𝑚 do {Formation of initial estimates of P1's mixed strategies} 
21:     ?̂?𝑖 ≔ 0  
22: end for  
23: ?̂?𝑖(𝑘) ≔ 1  
24: for 𝑗 ≔ 1 to 𝑛 do {Formation of initial estimates of P2's mixed strategies} 
25:     ?̂?𝑗 ≔ 0  
26: end for  
27: ?̂?𝑗(𝑘) ≔ 1  
28: 𝑘 ≔ 2 {Initial number of iteration related to the fictitious play cycle} 
29: do while δ̂𝑘 > ∆ {AMG's fictitious play cycle until the set precision is achieved} 
30: 𝑖(𝑘) ≔ 𝑎𝑟𝑔 max
𝑖
𝐴𝑖(𝑘 − 1) {Number of P1's pure strategy is chosen according to the P2's payoff} 
23: for 𝑗 ≔ 1 to 𝑛 do {A formation cycle of current average payoffs of P1} 
24:     𝑏𝑗 ≔ ?̃?𝑖𝑗   
25:     𝐵𝑗(𝑘) ≔ ((𝑘 − 1)𝐵𝑗(𝑘 − 1) + 𝑏𝑗) /𝑘 {Current average accumulated payoff of P1}  
26: end for  
27: 𝑉𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝑘) ≔ min
𝑗
𝐵𝑗(𝑘) {Current lower estimate of the game price} 
28: 𝑗(𝑘) ≔ 𝑎𝑟𝑔 min
𝑗
𝐵𝑗(𝑘) {Number of P2's best strategy is chosen according to the P1's payoff} 
29: for 𝑖 ≔ 1 to 𝑚 do {A formation cycle of current average payoffs of P2} 
30:     𝑎𝑖 ≔ ?̃?𝑖𝑗  
31:     𝐴𝑖(𝑘) ≔ ((𝑘 − 1)𝐴𝑖(𝑘 − 1) + 𝑎𝑖)/𝑘 {Current average accumulated payoff of P2}  
32: end for  
33: 𝑉𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑘) ≔ max
𝑖
𝐴𝑖(𝑘) {Current upper estimate of the game price} 
34: 𝑉(𝑘) ≔ (𝑉𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝑘) + 𝑉𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑘))/2{Current average estimate of the game price} 
35: for 𝑖 ≔ 1 to 𝑚 do {Cycle of computing initial estimates of P1's mixed strategies} 
36:    if 𝑖 = 𝑖(𝑘) then ?̂?𝑖(𝑘) ≔ ((𝑘 − 1)?̂?𝑖(𝑘−1) + 1) /𝑘  
37:        else ?̂?𝑖(𝑘) ≔ ((𝑘 − 1)?̂?𝑖(𝑘−1)) /𝑘 
38:    end if 
39: end for  
40: for 𝑗 ≔ 1 to 𝑛 do {Cycle of computing initial estimates of P2's mixed strategies} 
41:    if 𝑗 = 𝑗(𝑘) then ?̂?𝑗(𝑘) ≔ ((𝑘 − 1)?̂?𝑗(𝑘−1) + 1) /𝑘  
42:        else ?̂?𝑗(𝑘) ≔ ((𝑘 − 1)?̂?𝑗(𝑘−1)) /𝑘 
43:    end if 
44: end for  
45: δ̂𝑘 ≔ max(‖?̂?𝑘 − ?̂?𝑘−1‖; ‖?̂?𝑘 − ?̂?𝑘−1‖) {Convergence measure of the strategy estimates} 
46: if 𝑘 = 𝐾 then {Checking whether the maximum permissible number of iterations was achieved} 
47:     exit do {Exiting the fictitious play cycle on the basis of the iteration number}   
48: end if 
49: loop {End of AMG's fictitious play cycle} 
50: ?̂? ≔ ?̂?𝑘;  ?̂? ≔ ?̂?𝑘;  ?̂? ≔ 𝑉(𝑘) {Final estimates of AMG solution} 
 Transformation of the AMG solution into the LPP solution 
51: ?̂?𝑜𝑝𝑡 ≔
1
𝑉
 {Estimate of an optimal value of the LPP's objective function} 
52: for 𝑖 ≔ 1 to 𝑚 do {Estimates of optimal values of variables related to the direct LPP} 
  
53:     ?̂?𝑖
𝑜𝑝𝑡 ≔
𝑝𝑖
𝑎𝑖0𝑉
  
54: end for  
55: for 𝑗 ≔ 1 to 𝑛 do {Estimates of optimal values of variables related to the dual LPP} 
56:     ?̂?𝑗
𝑜𝑝𝑡 ≔
?̂?𝑗
𝑐𝑗𝑉
  
57: end for  
 
Picture 4 - LPP algorithm solution scheme based on the game iteration method. 
 
Algorithm 1 iterations are performed within a game 
block (lines 29-50). At that, the stopping rule is built 
according to the game indicators. However, if we move 
AMG-LPP solution transformation (lines 51-57) into the 
game block (after line 44), the convergence control can be 
performed directly according to the LPP solution estimates.    
COMPUTER IMPLEMENTATION AND TESTING 
The game iteration method that was suggested in this 
work for LPP solution, was implemented as a separate Skat 
program, written in Object Pascal in Delphi environment. 
Picture 5 shows an interface window of the program in 
question (result of LPP solution).  
 
 
Pic. 5. LPP solution algorithm window using a game iteration method  
in Skat program  
 
Skat allows solving rather large LPPs (up to several 
hundreds of variables and delimitations) with the necessary 
precision and within acceptable time (at modern computers - 
from fractions to unities of a second). Picture 5 shows results 
of solving LPP containing 12 variables and 15 delimitations. 
The program possesses large capabilities when downloading 
data from various sources and making necessary interface 
settings. When using two variables in LPP, Skat allows 
showing the results in a graphic form (see Pic. 6). 
Example. Let us demonstrate a provided scheme of 
solving LPP using a game iteration method with the aid of 
Skat on a simple example of a limited resource distribution 
[2].  
Let us presume the existence of a maximization task 
of some effect 𝐿(?̅?) that depends on the vector of variables 
?̅? = [𝑦1 𝑦2 𝑦3]𝑇. Structurally, these tasks correspond to 
the (7) - (8) setting, i.e. its optimal solution, in accordance 
with the game iteration method, shall be determined by the 
optimal strategy of a second player.  
 
 
 
Pic. 6. Window with a graphic presentation of LPP solution  
 
  
Therefore, according to the accepted definitions, the 
LPP is a dual one. Its objective function, criterion and 
delimitations are the following: 
𝐿(?̅?) = 3𝑦1 + 2𝑦2 + 5𝑦3 → max
?̅?
 ,           (19)   
𝑦1 + 2𝑦2 + 𝑦3 ≤ 430    
3𝑦1 + 0𝑦2 + 2𝑦3 ≤ 460
𝑦1 + 4𝑦2 + 0𝑦3 ≤ 420  
},                  (20) 
𝑦𝑗 ≥ 0, 𝑗 = 1,3̅̅ ̅̅ .                          (21)  
The antagonistic matrix game (19) - (21), being 
equivalent to LPP and with the consideration of (12), shall be 
presented as a following payoff matrix: 
𝐴 = [
77.519 232.558 46.512
217.391 0 86.957
79.365 476.190 0
] × 10−5.    (22) 
Having solved the game with the aid of Brown-
Robinson method in Skat, we receive the following:  
?̅? = [0.218520 0.681180 0]𝑇
?̅? = [0 0.148149 0.851851]𝑇
𝑉 = 74.074 × 10−5
}             (23) 
The optimal mixed strategies of the second player (?̅?) 
correspond to the optimal solution of a source dual LPP, while 
the ?̅? strategy of the first player corresponds to the direct LPP.  
Therefore, based on (14) and (23), the solution of a 
dual problem shall be the following:  
𝑦1 = 0; 𝑦2 = 100; 𝑦3 = 230;  𝐿 = 1350,       (24)  
solution of a direct LPP:  
𝑥1 = 1; 𝑥2 = 2; 𝑥3 = 0;  𝑊 = 1350.         (25) 
In order to check the appropriateness of the solution 
that was obtained by the game iteration method, the optimal 
solution of the (19) - (21) problem was also found with the 
aid of Solution Finder add-in in MS Excel. The obtained 
solution of a direct and dual LPP was absolutely the same as 
the values (24) and (25).   
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
1. The main characteristic of a game iteration 
method is a high rate of the optimal solution receipt. 
According to the data provided by the bibliographical sources 
[3, 8, 12-14], simplex method allows looking for the solution 
with the rate of the variables that depend exponentially on the 
space dimensionality (for instance, like 𝑐 × 2𝑛 where c is an 
invariable and n is a space dimensionality of the variables), 
while Karmarkar method provides a polynomial dependency 
of the solution's search rate on the space dimensionality (for 
example, 𝑐 × 𝑛 × 𝑚).  
The simulation experiment examining dependency 
of the convergence rate related to the LPP solution estimates, 
on the problem parameters has been performed with the aid 
of Skat software using a modern computer with the following 
parameters: Intel Core i7-4702MQ CPU 2*2.4 GHz, RAM 16 
Gb. The analysis performed with a fixed number of iterations 
(106) demonstrated that the computational speed (time 𝑡) does 
not depend only on the number of LPP variables (𝑛) and 
number of delimitations (𝑚), being first of all dependent on 
their total (𝑚 + 𝑛). The regression dependency is the 
following: 𝑡 = 0.044(𝑚 + 𝑛); [sec]. For example, the 
computational time for 𝑚 + 𝑛 = 100 + 100 = 200 is about 
8.8 seconds. It is necessary to mention that number of 
iterations equal to 106 provides a very high computational 
precision even for large problems. The precision in question 
is usually acceptable for the majority of applied problems on 
optimal control. Thus, when talking about the above-
mentioned example, the precision constitutes fractions and 
units of percents even with the iteration rate equal to 102.   
If the system response time is important, it is 
desirable to know the dependency of computational time on 
the number of iterations. We have varied this parameter in the 
computing experiment, where a degree (𝑒) of 10 was 
considered as a factor. The dimensionality factor (𝑚 + 𝑛) has 
also been varied. Quadratic (based on 𝑒 factor) two-factor 
regression model can be presented as: 𝑡 = 0.037(𝑚 + 𝑛) −
3.82𝑒 + 0.56𝑒2; [sec]. The determination coefficient of the 
model is 𝑅2 = 0.93. It provides a good description of the 
dependency between the computing duration and number of 
iterations within the 105 – 107 range. With the values less than 
105, even the large dimensionality computation is performed 
within deciseconds or centiseconds. Certainly, when 
implementing the game iteration algorithm on some on-board 
computers or microprocessors it is necessary to perform 
additional research devoted to the dependency of the 
computing time on the parameters of the computing 
environment and the problems that are being solved.   
2. The advantages of the game iteration method 
include its simplicity, transparency and a relatively high rate 
of the solution receipt. We can control the solution receipt rate 
by choosing an acceptable level of the calculation precision. 
These parameters open new possibilities for using linear 
optimization in the integrated control systems that are widely 
applied nowadays, for instance in robotic systems, smart 
homes, Internet of things etc. 
3. Disadvantages of the game iteration method 
include some limitation of the solved problems, caused by the 
fact that they should possess non-negative values of the right 
parts of delimitations and objective function coefficients. In 
some cases, this delimitation can be weakened by linear 
transformation of a variables space. However, it is necessary 
to mention that a significant number of problems on the 
optimal distribution of limited resources are related to the 
specific type that is discussed in this work. 
CONCLUSIONS 
1. The game iteration method that has been 
suggested in this work and oriented at the computational 
solution of a widely applied in practice optimization problem, 
i.e. linear programming problem, proved its work capacity 
with the problems of large dimensionality. 
2. Using multiple model examples, the author has 
showed that the rate of the solution's computational search 
with the application of the game iteration method is linearly 
dependent on the total amount of dimensionality of the 
variables space and number of delimitations, which is an 
important advantage of the suggested method in comparison 
  
with others that are used when solving linear programming 
problems. 
3. Implementation of a game iteration method in the 
Skat program that is presented in the work, allows solving 
linear programming problems in various applications, while 
its libraring version (.dll) provides a possibility for other 
applications to import functions of a game iteration method. 
4. High rate of solving linear programming 
optimization problems using a game iteration method allows 
using this easy and stable algorithm as a part of on-board 
algorithms responsible for optimal management of modern 
integrated control systems in various applied spheres.  
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